Narratives in Conflict: Anti-Zionist Claims vs. Historical Realities
In the ongoing discourse surrounding Israel, Zionism, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, perspectives often clash along ideological lines.
This article is based on Jay Shapiro's Interview of Coleman Hughes on the August 21, 2025 Dilemma Podcast (Part 1 and Part 2).
I encourage you to listen to all 2 hours and 40 minutes. In my experience, Anti-Zionists like Shapiro contort facts to paint Western values (and Israel as their outpost) as inherently flawed, an "original sin" negating all else. On the other hand, Pro-Zionists see flaws but affirm democracy, self-determination, and progress as forces for good. Yes, the Middle East is complicated—horrible views exist in Israeli society, and peace-seeking Palestinians deserve amplification. But vilifying Israel singularly, with double standards, isn't just irrational and historically selective; it's morally bankrupt, dangerous, and often veers into antisemitism by exceptionalizing Jewish sovereignty.
This piece is my attempt to present a hypothetical interview between myself and Jay Shapiro. Below, I tried to present Jay Shapiro’s arguments as accurately as I could based upon the transcripts of the podcast above. There is a great deal of information contained in each of the 30+ individual blood libels chronicled in www.bloodlibels.com. This article is merely my attempt to provide a single post that highlights some of the mental gymnastics that "progressive" critics of Israel have to go through to sustain their arguments.
I hope you’ll conclude after reading this - or listening to the podcast linked above - that Shapiro's stance relies on selective history and moral relativism that ultimately crumbles under scrutiny. Judge for yourself.
1. On the Origins of Zionism and the Nakba
Jay’s Argument: Andy, let's start with the framing of good guys and bad guys in this conflict. I see Zionism as inherently colonial—rooted in British imperial support, with early groups like Irgun1 and Haganah2 acting as terrorists targeting civilians and justifying land claims via biblical mandates like "from the river to the sea." The Nakba wasn't symbolic; it was visceral displacement—Holocaust survivors moving into homes with food still on the stove, shoes in the hallway. Palestinians have suffered massive injustice from Zionists collaborating with the UK, and dismissing that as just "get over it" ignores the origin story of Palestinian resistance. How do you square that with claims Israel just wants peace with its neighbors?
My Response: I appreciate you grounding this in history—it's crucial for understanding without falling into caricatures that echo old antisemitic tropes of Jewish conspiracies or inherent aggression. History demonstrates that Zionism was never about empire-building; it was a desperate survival strategy born from European antisemitism, where Jews faced pogroms and exclusion. Theodor Herzl's3 vision was a refuge for a persecuted people, not conquest—Jews arrived as refugees, buying land legally under Ottoman and British rule. Balfour's declaration4 may have been flawed, but it reflected Britain's post-WWI mandates, not a grand Jewish colonial plot against Palestinians. Zionism was national liberation. Colonizers don’t return to their ancestral homeland, revive their ancient language, and center their identity in Jerusalem and Hebron. As for the Nakba, it's a tragedy of displacement for 700,000 Palestinians, but context matters: it followed Arab rejection of the UN partition plan5 and attacks on Jewish communities, plus invasions by five Arab armies where Jews fought for their survival in an existential war. Palestinians suffered enormously—but so did Jews, lest we forget similar numbers expelled from Arab countries. The uniqueness isn't 1948's violence6 (common in partitions like India-Pakistan), but 1949: Israel offered to repatriate 300,000 refugees in exchange for peace, but Arab leaders refused, prioritizing rejectionism over state-building. The Zionist “project” could have ended with Israel's creation in 1948, as the state accepted those borders (and later the 1967 lines post-war), willing to compromise for peace—even on a united Jerusalem, which is preferable but not absolute. In terms of the Irgun and Haganah, at founding, “radicals” like Begin7 and Shamir deferred to Ben-Gurion8 who was supported by the majority, showing Israel's democratic integration over extremism. And if Israeli’s were as evil as you describe, how do you reconcile with the fact that in your counterfactual there should be no Arab citizens of Israel today. Yet nearly 2 million Arabs live as equal citizens—voting, serving in the Knesset, even sitting on the Supreme Court. That lived reality proves Zionism was not about erasing Palestinians but ensuring Jewish survival.
2. On Suppression of Moderate Palestinian Voices
Jay’s Argument: But look at how Israel has suppressed moderate Palestinian voices—people like Ghassan Kanafani9, a poet and writer killed in 1972 by Israel, or Mubarak Awad10, the "Palestinian Gandhi," deported in 1988 for nonviolent resistance. Israel eliminates those advocating coexistence or two-states, like Marwan Barghouti11, because it's useful to face extremists like Hamas. This ensures no real partner for peace, allowing expansion. It's like propping up villains to justify actions—why else kill a writer like Kanafani, who beautifully articulated Palestinian dignity in works like "Letter from Gaza"?
My Response: Jay, these are serious claims, and we must examine them factually to avoid narratives that unfairly single out Israel in ways that border on antisemitic exceptionalism—treating Jewish self-defense as uniquely sinister while ignoring similar actions elsewhere. Kanafani wasn't just a poet; he led the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist group behind hijackings and attacks like the Lod Airport massacre in 1972, killing 26. His assassination, while tragic, occurred amid PFLP terrorism targeting Israelis—context matters, as violence begets violence.
Awad's deportation stemmed from his role in the First Intifada12, which included nonviolence but escalated into widespread violence against Israeli civilians. Israel has faced real threats, but it's not systematically eliminating moderates—Barghouti, for example, was convicted of murder in civilian courts for directing attacks during the Second Intifada13.
Palestinian moderates exist, but rejectionist factions like Hamas often dominate due to internal dynamics, not just Israeli actions. Both sides' extremists thrive on distrust—Israeli settlers provoke, Palestinian militants reject peace offers (e.g., 2000 Camp David). Blaming Israel alone overlooks Palestinian agency and risks excusing violence. To the extent Palestinians have had moderates, they are not celebrated by Palestinians themselves—Israel may deserve some blame for not promoting them more, but Palestinians are responsible for their own fate, just as Americans chose Washington and Israel chose Ben-Gurion despite adversaries trying to split them apart.
3. On Israel's Ties to Apartheid South Africa
Jay’s Argument: Israel's deep ties to apartheid South Africa—weapons swaps, uranium for nukes, training police who oppressed Black South Africans—weren't just instrumental; they reveal shared ideologies of controlling "subversive" populations. This exposes nefarious Zionist intentions, prioritizing dominance over justice.
My Response: Analogies to apartheid are charged and often misused in ways that delegitimize Jewish self-determination, echoing antisemitic calls to dismantle Israel as uniquely evil. The analogies have no basis in history—Israel's Arab citizens have voting rights, unlike in apartheid South Africa, and Israel's civilian casualty record is better than Europe's in similar conflicts. The presence of 2 million Arab Israeli citizens with full rights exemplifies Israel's coexistence model, as they hold citizenship, vote, and access institutions equally, refuting claims of systemic dominance and highlighting democratic inclusivity. With respect to your point, Israel's 1970s ties to South Africa were pragmatic—during global isolation post-1967, when Arab states boycotted Israel and the USSR armed its enemies. It involved arms and uranium, but Israel later supported anti-apartheid efforts, including Mandela's ANC (Mandela visited Israel positively in 1999). Many democracies, including the US and UK, had ties to apartheid regimes for Cold War reasons—it's not unique to Zionism. This doesn't define Zionist intentions; Zionism is about Jewish survival in a hostile world, not domination. Labeling Israel "apartheid" ignores Arab-Israeli citizens' rights (voting, Supreme Court seats) and misapplies a term from a racially segregated system. The conflict's roots are in competing nationalisms, not racism—focusing on South Africa distracts from mutual steps needed for peace.
4. On Policies in Gaza and Alleged Starvation
Jay’s Argument: Israel's policies look like intentional starvation to make Gaza unlivable—calorie-counting blockades pre-October 7, now aid restrictions amid famine. Statements suggest it's "moral" to starve but the world won't allow it. This isn't self-defense; it's ethnic cleansing to clear land for settlers, exploiting crises.
My Response: Claims of deliberate starvation must be fact-checked rigorously, as inflated accusations fuel antisemitic blood libels portraying Jews as cruel oppressors. Data shows no mass starvation: UNRWA reported 250,000+ tons of aid entering Gaza in 2024 more than in any war to an enemy population, with Israel facilitating entry despite Hamas diversion. There's hunger in Gaza—widespread and dangerous—but not systematic starvation; that's a myth amplified for pressure. Pre-2007 blockades were in response to rocket fire after Israel's 2005 withdrawal and disengagement in Gaza — calorie guidelines ensured humanitarian needs, not malice. Hamas embeds in civilians, using aid for tunnels and weapons, inflating casualty figures to pressure Israel maximize suffering, create the asymmetry, not Israeli malice. Israel's aim is degrading Hamas, not cleansing—evidenced by no mass expulsions despite power to do so. Again, the presence of 2 million Arab Israeli citizens with full rights illustrates Israel's capacity for coexistence, as it extends democratic protections to its Arab minority, countering accusations of ethnic cleansing intent and showing a societal model that values integration over exclusion. Ethnic cleansing claims ignore Israel's withdrawals (Sinai 1982, Gaza 2005) and offers (e.g., 2000: 95% West Bank). Smotrich is fringe—Israel's democracy checks such extremism, as seen in protests against judicial reforms. Gaza's suffering is tragic, but blaming Israel solely overlooks Hamas's strategy of maximizing civilian harm for propaganda. Solutions require demilitarizing Hamas, not assuming genocidal intent. Despite obstacles, before October 7th, nearly every Palestinian in Gaza and the West Bank was locally governed by Palestinian entities, and none of those governing entities prioritized bringing prosperity to the Palestinians.
5. On Solutions: One-State vs. Two-State
Jay’s Argument: Ultimately, a one-state solution could work—Jews and Palestinians negotiating coexistence, with over 50% chance of success if justice (dignity, right of return) is addressed. Peace emerges from justice, not vice versa. Two-states ignores demographic realities and ongoing occupation.
My Response: Jay, one-state solution optimism risks ignoring history's lessons, which could inadvertently promote narratives erasing Jewish statehood—a subtle antisemitic undercurrent in some anti-Zionist rhetoric. No Middle Eastern multi-ethnic state has avoided sectarian violence (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq). With mutual fears—Israelis of extermination, Palestinians of domination—trust for two-states is already low; one-state would amplify risks, likely devolving into civil war. Justice means recognizing both peoples' rights: Palestinians to statehood, Jews to security post-Holocaust. Two-states, with land swaps and demilitarization, is the pragmatic path—history shows withdrawals (Gaza) didn't bring peace due to rejectionism. Palestinians and Israelis lack trust after violence; two states is the pragmatic path, but requires accepting Israel's permanence. Oslo14 nearly succeeded, but rejectionism (Arafat at Camp David 200015) shifted Israel rightward—not expansionism, but fear. Shapiro confuses justice for peace—the Palestinians' cry for justice is understandable but counterproductive. As a Jew, I want justice, but the Russians/Poles/Ukrainians who persecuted my ancestors will never give it. They can offer peace, and Israel and Jews generally accept peace from Poland, Ukraine, and Germany, and would from Russia if offered.
Closing Thoughts
This point-counterpoint illustrates the deep divides: one side sees systemic injustice rooted in Zionism's origins, the other views it as necessary self-defense amid rejectionism. Both draw on history, but interpretations differ. For peace, dialogue must bridge these gaps, rejecting extremism on all sides.
What do you think? Share in the comments.
Irgun (Etzel, 1931–1948) was a Zionist paramilitary group that broke from Haganah, fighting British Mandate forces and Arabs. Led by Begin, it conducted operations like Deir Yassin (1948). Merged into IDF post-independence. For more: Irgun; Jewish Virtual Library.
Haganah (1920–1948) was the main Zionist defense force in Mandate Palestine, protecting Jewish communities. It became the IDF core in 1948. For more: Haganah; Jewish Virtual Library.
Theodor Herzl (1860–1904) was an Austro-Hungarian journalist and playwright who founded modern political Zionism. Raised in a secular Jewish family, he was influenced by rising antisemitism in Europe (e.g., the Dreyfus Affair). His 1896 pamphlet Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) proposed a sovereign Jewish homeland as a solution to persecution. He convened the First Zionist Congress in 1897, establishing the Zionist Organization. Herzl died young but laid Zionism's foundations. For more: Theodor Herzl; Herzl Institute: Theodor Herzl.
The Balfour Declaration (November 2, 1917) was a British government statement supporting "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," while protecting non-Jewish communities' rights. Issued by Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour amid WWI, it aimed to gain Jewish support for the Allies and secure British interests in the Middle East. It contributed to the Mandate for Palestine but was criticized for ignoring Arab majority rights. For more: Avalon Project: Balfour Declaration Text; Britannica: Balfour Declaration.
The 1947 UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181) proposed dividing Palestine into Jewish (56%) and Arab (44%) states, with Jerusalem internationalized. Jews accepted; Arabs rejected, leading to civil war.
The 1948 Arab-Israeli War began after Israel's independence declaration (May 14, 1948), with invasions by Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Israel won, expanding territory; armistices set Green Line. Caused Palestinian refugee crisis and Jewish expulsions from Arab states. For more: U.S. State Dept: Arab-Israeli War of 1948.
Menachem Begin (1913–1992) was Irgun's leader (1943–1948), a Zionist militant group fighting British rule. Born in Poland, he fled to Palestine in 1942. Irgun conducted attacks like the King David Hotel bombing (1946). Begin became Israel's sixth PM (1977–1983), signing the Camp David Accords. Yitzhak Shamir (1915–2012) led Lehi (Stern Gang, 1940–1948), known for assassinations like Lord Moyne's (1944). Born in Poland, he immigrated in 1935. Shamir served as PM (1983–1984, 1986–1992), overseeing Lebanon War operations. Both integrated into Israel's democracy post-1948. For more: Britannica: Menachem Begin.
David Ben-Gurion (1886–1973), born David Grün in Poland, was Israel's founding father and first PM (1948–1954, 1955–1963). Raised Zionist, he immigrated to Palestine in 1906, co-founded Histadrut and Mapai party. As Haganah leader, he unified Zionist forces into the IDF. He declared Israel's independence in 1948 and led during the war. For more: Britannica: David Ben-Gurion.
Ghassan Kanafani (1936–1972) was a Palestinian writer, journalist, and spokesman for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist group. Known for novels like Men in the Sun and Returning to Haifa, which explored Palestinian displacement and identity, he also played a political role in the PFLP, which conducted armed operations against Israel. He was assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut on July 8, 1972, along with his niece, in what Israel later claimed was retaliation for the PFLP's involvement in the Lod Airport massacre (May 1972), where 26 people were killed. Kanafani denied direct involvement in the massacre but defended the group's actions as resistance. For more: Haaretz: The Tragic Life of Ghassan Kanafani.
Mubarak Awad (born 1943) is a Palestinian-American psychologist and nonviolent activist often called the "Palestinian Gandhi" for advocating peaceful resistance against Israeli occupation. He founded the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence in Jerusalem in 1983, promoting civil disobedience inspired by Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. During the First Intifada (1987–1993), Israel deported him in 1988, accusing him of inciting unrest; Awad appealed to Israel's Supreme Court but lost. He returned to the U.S. and continues advocating nonviolence through Nonviolence International.
Marwan Barghouti is often described by Palestinians as the ‘Palestinian Mandela’ he is viewed as one of the strongest leadership candidates to succeed Mahmoud Abbas and was expected to run in the July 2021 presidential elections . Together with Nasser Kidwa, he also co-led the ‘Freedom‘ list in advance of the May 2021 legislative elections. Both elections were ultimately cancelled by Abbas. In the run-up to the First Intifada, Barghouti was a student leader at Bir Zeit University involved in popular protests. He was deported by Israel to Jordan in May 1987 and was only allowed to return to the West Bank in 1993 as part of the Oslo Accords. The following year, in 1994, he became secretary-general of Fatah in the West Bank. During the Second Intifada, he allegedly directed military attacks against Israeli targets. Israel accuses him of having established the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AMB) at the time. Barghouti was arrested and sentenced by an Israeli military court in 2002 to five consecutive life sentences for orchestrating attacks on Israelis. Since his imprisonment, Barghouti has been active in the prisoners’ movement and has published various articles from prison to communicate with the outside world. While in prison, he helped draft the 2006 National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners — which he co-signed with Abdulkhaleq al-Natsheh (Hamas), Bassam Sa’adi (PIJ), Abdel Rahim Mallouh (PFLP), and Mustafa Badarneh (DFLP). In 2017, he led a large-scale hunger strike to demand improved rights and conditions for prisoners.
The First Intifada (1987–1993) was a Palestinian-led uprising against Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, initiated by Palestinians through widespread protests, strikes, stone-throwing, and attacks on Israeli forces and civilians. Sparked by an Israeli truck incident in Jabalia camp on December 9, 1987, that killed four Palestinian workers—perceived as deliberate—it quickly escalated into organized violence, including Molotov cocktails and ambushes, rejecting the emerging peace dialogue post-Madrid Conference precursors. Casualties were significant: over 1,000 Palestinians killed (many by Israeli forces), with estimates up to 5,000 total deaths and 10,000–15,000 wounded; Israeli casualties included about 160 killed and thousands injured, including civilians targeted in attacks. The uprising undermined early peace efforts, eroding trust and delaying negotiations, while damaging Palestinian credibility as partners by shifting global sympathy amid the violence's intensity. It ended with the Oslo Accords in 1993, but the fallout hardened Israeli security measures. For more: CFR: What is U.S. Policy on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?; BBC: Palestinian Territories Timeline.
The Second Intifada (2000–2005), also known as the al-Aqsa Intifada, was a Palestinian-initiated escalation of violence following the breakdown of the Camp David Summit in July 2000, where Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat rejected Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's offer of ~95% of the West Bank and Gaza with land swaps, opting instead for confrontation amid stalled peace talks. Triggered by Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000—seen as provocative but peaceful—the uprising began with riots and rapidly involved suicide bombings, shootings, and attacks by groups like the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, targeting Israeli civilians and soldiers. Casualties were devastating: over 3,000 Palestinians killed (many in clashes or operations), and more than 1,000 Israelis (including civilians in bombings that killed hundreds); total fatalities exceeded 4,300, with tens of thousands injured on both sides. This violence severely undermined the Oslo peace process, destroying mutual trust, leading to Israel's construction of the security barrier, and eroding Palestinian credibility as reliable partners by associating their cause with terrorism in global eyes. It ended amid exhaustion, with Israel's 2005 Gaza withdrawal, but hardened positions for years. For more: CFR: What is U.S. Policy on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict?; BBC: Palestinian Territories Timeline.
The Oslo Accords (1993–1995) were agreements between Israel and PLO for limited Palestinian self-rule in West Bank/Gaza, creating the PA. Led to mutual recognition but failed to resolve core issues, sparking Second Intifada. For more: Britannica: Oslo Accords.
The 2000 Camp David Summit (July 11–25) aimed to resolve final-status issues; Israel offered ~95% West Bank/Gaza with swaps. Arafat rejected without counteroffer, leading to Second Intifada. For more: HonestReporting: Arafat Rejected Peace.